It will take more than that. Thanks to the cold war, Somalia is awash in guns. After allowing the Soviet Union to arm them, the Somalis switched sides, allowing the Americans to arm them again. Then came two years of civil war and social collapse. Now armed robbery is just about the only trade that still offers employment to thousands of young men. Lasting peace cannot be imposed unless most of them are disarmed. But whose job is that, and how long will it take? So far, Operation Restore Hope has been relatively smooth, apart from a media circus on the landing beaches, which the military originally encouraged and then complained about (page 32). But anyone who makes a serious attempt at gun control in Somalia could quickly become stuck in the bottomless quicksands of African politics. If American troops have to disarm the entire country, they will probably get out of Somalia in time for Bill Clinton’s second Inaugural, but surely not for his first.
In a private meeting at the United Nations last Wednesday, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali dropped a bombshell. He told Bush administration officials that he expected the American-led intervention force to disarm more or less the whole country. He also wanted the troops to clear large minefields in the north, where the Americans hadn’t planned to go, and to set up and train an indigenous police force to maintain civil order. Those tasks could take years. Washington had a narrower view of its mission: provide enough security to permit the delivery of food and other relief supplies. The Americans hoped that almost all of their own forces would be able to start leaving in two or three months, to be replaced by a smaller, less aggressive contingent of U.N. peacekeepers, who would see to disarming and rebuilding the country. “He wants us to do a lot more than we had ever contemplated in Somalia,” a senior administration official said of Boutros-Ghali. “When you expand our mandate, this operation becomes less and less doable.”
But the mandate was to make peace. “If a coalition of perhaps 50,000 soldiers with the most advanced weapons on earth can’t disarm the Somalis,” asked a U.N. Secretariat official, “then how can 3,500 lightly armed peacekeepers do it?” The U.N. resolution that authorized the intervention was vague; it instructed the Americans only to “establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations.” Boutros-Ghali’s broader demand was a bargaining position. By the end of this week, he must give the Security Council a preliminary report describing how the United Nations will police Somalia once the intervention force has left. Neither he nor anyone else has a clear idea how that job can be done. Boutros-Ghali hopes the Americans and their allies will do as much of it as possible before his peacekeepers have to take over.
Already, guns are less visible on the streets of Mogadishu. Weeks ago Western intelligence agencies began to spot Somali warlords moving forces and heavy weapons into the interior, apparently anticipating an intervention. Gangs of robbers and freelance thugs also were seen stockpiling weapons. Last week the Marines seized any guns larger than sidearms when they spotted them on the streets. “We’re going to confiscate those weapons that are a direct threat, but we’re not going to go out and look for them,” said Col. Fred Peck, a task-force spokesman. The Americans also planned to use persuasion, as well as force. NEWSWEEK has learned that the Pentagon will send more than 1,500 special-operations soldiers to Somalia, including as many as two battalions of Green Berets, a large contingent of civil-affairs specialists and psychological-warfare teams. Some of the civil-affairs soldiers would stay behind after the intervention force leaves to support and advise U.N. peacekeepers as they try to confiscate weapons.
“The rule of the gun has to end in Somalia. Everyone agrees on that,” says a top U.S. official. “The question is how you do it.” The United Nations not only lacks the military muscle for the job; it also does not have enough political influence in Somalia to broker a negotiated settlement that might lead to disarmament. That may turn out to be another job for the Americans. One U.S. official accuses Gen. Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of “naivete,” arguing that “this division Powell has insisted upon between polities and military options is unrealistic.” Sources say Powell has recently come around to the view that the United States must make a major political effort in Somalia, together with the military campaign. The key question, officials say, is whether diplomat Robert Oakley, the special U.S. envoy to Somalia, can persuade the warlords to disarm.
He got off to a good start. In a meeting arranged by Oakley and the U.S. military commander, Lt. Gen. Robert Johnston, Somalia’s two most powerful warlords agreed to end their partition of Mogadishu. Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Mohamed also promised to pull their fighting men and armed vehicles off the streets and to start talks on political reconciliation. But the agreement did not bind the forces of other warlords or independent gangs. And neither Aidid nor Ali Mahdi had yet shown he could be trusted. “This is a marriage of convenience,” said a U.S. official. “These guys are doing what makes sense to them for the time being.”
By last week 35 nations had promised to contribute troops, supplies or money to the Somali operation. But it was taking longer than originally expected to get forces out into the country’s starvation belt. The Americans wanted to build up along the coast so that they could deal effectively with any fighting that might develop inland. “Logistics first,” said Colonel Peck. Last Friday General Johnston warned that it might take “seven to 10 days” to establish a “relatively permanent” military presence in beleaguered Baidoa. NEWSWEEK’S Rod Nordland found many relief workers in the city who thought that was too long to wait. His report:
The CARE team in Baidoa spends $20,000 a day on security-paying local gunmen, including their own guards, not to attack them. CARE runs feeding programs that reach more than 250,000 people, but it’s been three months since a truck convoy got through from Mogadishu. Relief workers say an attempt on Nov. 11 failed when the convoy’s guards switched sides and looted the food on behalf of Yusef Sharif, who claims to govern Baidoa for the United Somali Congress (USC), the political movement that is split between Aidid and Ali Mahdi. Then the food shipment was attacked by a rival USC faction, the security men at the airport, who supposedly work for the relief organizations. They killed 40 of the turncoats, and all of the food disappeared.
Ahmed Awil, a local leader of another armed faction, the Somali Democratic Movement, one of the parties to the marketplace shoot-out, favors disarming the looters-those other ones. “If the American troops stay only in the towns, then the thieves will go to the bush, killing the people there,” he says. “The troops will have to go into the villages and collect every gun.” But by late last week, the Americans still hadn’t shown up in Baidoa, and as predatory gunmen circled their compounds, relief workers were increasingly bitter. “The Americans never could get it right,” said Irishman Micheal O’Reilly, a field director for Concern. “They certainly didn’t in Vietnam, and in the gulf they left the job half done.” He added: “They should have come here right away. The longer they take to get here, the worse it’s going to become.”
“It isn’t true there’s no legitimate government here,” claims Yusef Sharif “I am the government, and the troops are under control.” But he admits his soldiers can’t stop some of the worst looters, because they all belong to the same clan. The governor says he is looking forward to the arrival of U.S. troops. “I want to be friends with the Americans,” says the man who is often described as Baidoa’s chief bandit.
The Americans still hadn’t decided how much of the country they would disarm, or how to do it. Some U.S. officials wanted to buy guns with money or food. “We should be buying them up by the thousands,” said Peul Henze, a Rand Corp. analyst. “It would be a serious mistake to line people up and take their weapons. They’ll just go find more to shoot us with.” At the United Nations, where a food-for-arms idea was studied and rejected months ago, an official said any such trade would be unworkable without a political settlement. “The Somalis won’t dream of handing over their weapons unless they are assured that rival clans will stop attacking them,” he said.
Confiscation by force wasn’t something the Marines wanted to contemplate. Last week one squad found a large stash of weapons in a building across the street from the U.S. Embassy. Outnumbered by the arsenal’s Somali guards, the Marines were ordered to withdraw without seizing the weapons, which apparently were being stockpiled by one of the factions under the terms of their agreement. If a political settlement can be achieved, such arsenals might be used to equip a national army or police force. The warlords and their henchmen hope to play just such a role; a settlement will have to balance their competing interests-and those of the long-suffering civilians. If the U.S.-led peacemakers cannot quickly arrange a fair deal, it is hard to see how Somalia can escape the rule of the gun.
Mogadishu’s airport, port and the strip of land in between, including the U.S. Embassy and Baledogle airport
More than 3,000 U.S. Marines and about 150 French legionnaires by the weekend
Three clashes on the ground, causing two Somali deaths; U.S. Cobra helicopter gunships destroyed three armed Somali vehicles that fired on them
Forces will work on improving infrastructure and building up for a thrust into the starvation belt
Baledogle: Airport surveyed and secured
Mogadishu: Marine amphibious assault secures airport and port
