NATO members, apparently satisfied with a U.S. intelligence briefing linking the bombings to Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden, say they are ready to join Washington in an armed response. The Pentagon has positioned equipment in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, and both President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have warned Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban to hand over bin Laden or face the consequences.
Yet military action seems highly unlikely in the coming days, and possibly for a week or longer.
Experts on South Asia say the Bush administration’s patience has been appropriate, and if continued can achieve two broad goals: the overthrow of the Taliban regime that has harbored bin Laden, and isolation and the eventual capture of bin Laden himself. For now, developments on the ground seem to be moving, with outside assistance, toward the collapse of Taliban rule.
To be sure, there are military targets in Afghanistan that U.S. warplanes or missiles could hit and, in so doing, help shift the balance of military power against the Taliban militias ruling the country. These include about 20 Russian-made MiG aircraft, as well as radio communications facilities, and military headquarters. A certain target is the headquarters of the so-called 55th Brigade, a unit of 700 or more Arabs and other non-Afghans who have been trained by bin Laden and protect him. Those targets aside, “mostly what’s there is rubble,” says Larry Goodson, professor of international relations at Bentley College in Waltham, Mass.
And bombing all those sites would be “about a half hour’s work” for the U.S. Air Force, says Barnett Rubin, director of studies at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation. Rubin and Goodson are among a number of leading U.S. experts on Afghanistan who have been urging the administration to hold its fire while political developments unfold on the ground.
A prime reason is that the recent agreement between groups comprising the Northern Alliance–the rebel forces in north Afghanistan–and Zahir Shah, the deposed king who lives in Rome, has spurred efforts across a broad front to shift the loyalties of the local military leaders in Afghanistan away from the Taliban.
According to Rubin, there are complicated negotiations under way between individuals in the current Taliban structure (as well as others in positions of power) and associates connected to ousted monarch Zahir Shah, former commanders in the anti-Soviet mujahedin and former tribal commanders. “If the United States comes in and bombs anything in Afghanistan, some of these people will think: ‘Now a nonbeliever has attacked Muslim territory. We have to fight for country, for honor, for Islam.’ We don’t want to trigger that reflex.”
But patience and diplomacy with tribal and regional leaders in Afghanistan could pay big dividends, says Goodson, who has just published “Afghanistan’s Endless War” (University of Washington Press.) “There are a lot of guys, especially now that the tide has turned, who are ripe for the plucking. We could dismantle [the Taliban] within a matter of weeks. And once it starts to crumble, it is easier to make it crumble by judicious and not-so-judicious uses of cash.” He thinks the total cost could be as little as $2 to $3 million.
What makes the talks complex is that individual commanders have to be certain they have shored up their own base with loyal fighters, and they may also want to negotiate the security of their families and assure their future roles in any new government.
The latest evidence that this process is gaining momentum is from the Taliban regime itself. Its statements have seemed confused and contradictory, one day denying knowledge of bin Laden’s whereabouts, and the next declaring that they will not hand him over to the United States. Now there are signs that they fear their grip on power is coming to an end. One indicator: a recent warning that anyone who collaborates with outside political opponents of the regime will be viewed as a traitor and executed.
Will a measured approach that takes advantage of local political factors indeed make it more likely the United States can capture bin Laden and close down his terrorist network? Goodson says ending of Taliban rule will make it that much easier for U.S. Special Operations forces to locate and arrest or kill bin Laden. On the other hand, if Pashtun tribal and regional leaders–members of the country’s dominant group–switch allegiance away from the Taliban, they may be all too willing to hunt down bin Laden for a sizable bounty. “You don’t need military action,” says a Pakistan diplomatic source. “I wouldn’t be surprised if in the end you have a pitched battle between Pashtun leaders and him.”
