As the attacks escalated, NEWSWEEK’s Kevin Peraino spoke with Uzi Arad, a former Mossad official and adviser to Israel’s right-wing former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Excerpts:
NEWSWEEK: Do you think [former prime minister] Ariel Sharon would have responded to the kidnappings as vigorously as the current government has?
ARAD: My suspicion is no. Sharon’s policy at the end of his term was very, very defensive. His last act of policy [before suffering an incapacitating stroke] was essentially to engineer the retreat from Gaza, which, in some ways, may have triggered this outburst of violence. I don’t think that Sharon, at this stage of his formidable career, was going to take the bold action that the present Israeli cabinet and government is taking.
Why do you think Olmert broke with that policy?
This was clearly an escalation that could not go unanswered. Reality has forced itself on the Olmert administration. Being more attentive to the military and defense officials than Sharon was, that reality must have impressed itself on the prime minister. Once they had to address that reality, I think the outcome was inevitable.
Some critics say, “Wait a minute, Israel is punishing the good guys. They’re hitting a Lebanese government that is now controlled largely by anti-Syrian figures.” Do you risk alienating the moderates there?
The concept of “good guys” is a relative one. In effect, they are accomplices. They are giving aid and comfort and sanction and sanctuary to the terrorists. The Hizbullah are members of the Lebanese government. The Lebanese cannot refrain from taking charge of their sovereign territory, and then claim innocence. Either they act responsibly … or if they fail that, they cannot enjoy the relative adjective of being good guys. They are good only in the sense that they are not the worst of criminals. But they are certainly accomplices to an active crime.
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has announced a U.N. mission to try to resolve the crisis. Will that have any effect?
This is not the time to take stock of the very sorry and very disappointing role of the U.N. in Lebanon over all those years. The U.N. had forces in Lebanon. That came at the expense of billions of dollars wasted with forces who did essentially nothing in the face of continuous attacks against Israel. And the diplomatic role that the U.N. is playing when it comes to bringing about quiet in southern Lebanon is very, very melancholy. The credibility of the U.N. here is less than zero.
Is there any bitterness in Israeli policy circles about Bush’s push for democracy in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories?
There’s no uniformity. There are those like Netanyahu who have cautioned again and again about the disengagement from Gaza, arguing that inevitably it would bring about the strengthening of Hamas. But that was Netanyahu’s position. I don’t think we should pass judgment on Washington on this accord. The Sharon government record on this is not much different [from Bush’s].
What lessons has Israel learned from the last Lebanon war?
Israel should learn that escapism is not a productive strategy. It could be a feel-good strategy because it gives you the sense that you’re taking the initiative, that you are being magnanimous and that you’re investing in peace. But escapism, in this particular case, was escaping realities. Reality will force itself on you sooner or later. In 1995, we withdrew from the populated areas of the West Bank, allowing [Palestinian leader Yasir] Arafat and his ex-terrorists to implant themselves in the hope that they would change their colors. It took a short time for them to turn against us. Then in the year 2000, we retreated from Lebanon in the belief that Hizbullah would turn its attention to domestic affairs. Actually, Hizbullah kept harassing us from day one.
What about tactical or operational lessons?
Tactically, it shows that we can sometimes evacuate territories and rely primarily on air power and air-derived intelligence, which is an encouraging finding which allows you greater flexibility. At the same time, however, the tactical lesson is that we have to establish the cordon sanitaire . We simply cannot walk out and ignore what’s happening behind us.
How closely—if at all—have Hamas and Hizbullah collaborated in the past?
They are comrades at arms in the great radical offensive against the West. They do have operational contact, and they employ similar violent means—suicide bombings, kidnappings, firing rockets into civilian areas. And they also have similar contacts with Iran and Syria. It’s not a strictly hierarchical organization, but they’re all members of the same alliance.
Does Israel have the resources and public support to wage war on two fronts—or maybe more?
Israel has no choice. It has to do whatever it can. It does have the resources. But this is a larger struggle than Israel’s alone. The threat that Syria poses, or the threat that Iran poses, to the region and the activation of these groups is a regional, global threat. To cope with that global threat, we have international efforts now under way—be it at the G8, when it comes to containing Iran’s march to nuclear capabilities, or Syria, which defiantly acted in a catastrophic way both in Lebanon and with Saddam. These are regional and international problems.
Do you think the military campaign will extend in the near future to Syria?
Inevitably, sooner or later, if Syria persists in what it has been doing, yes, it will. I can’t say when or how. As long as you have this festering of negative, destructive and essentially aggressive forces, as long as they feel they enjoy immunity in their sanctuaries or because they perceive a Western weakness and reluctance to confront that challenge, they will persist. Sooner or later, the Western world will have to face up to this problem.
